Improving the Analysis of Foreign Affairs: Evaluating Structured Analytic Techniques

Research suggests that foreign affairs analysis is weak—even the best analysts are accurate less than 35 percent of the time (Tetlock 2005). To compensate for analytic weaknesses, some have called for the use of structured analytic techniques, that is, formalized judgement-driven methods. This imperative was enshrined in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004), which mandates that analysts use these techniques. This research investigates how the techniques have been applied in the U.S. intelligence community (IC) while making a modest attempt to evaluate 12 core techniques. The investigation of how the techniques are applied is based on semi-structured interviews with 5 intelligence experts and a survey of 80 analysts at an IC agency, along with follow-up interviews with 15 analysts. Interestingly, 1 in 3 analysts reported never using the techniques. Two factors were related to the use of the techniques: analytic training (p=0.001, Cramer's V=0.41) and the perception of their value (p=.049, Cramér's V= 0.23). There was not a statistically significant relation between the time pressure under which analysts work and their use of the techniques (p=0.74). Questions about the effectiveness of the techniques were answered in part by employing a “systematic review,” a novel methodology for synthesizing a large body of research. A random sample of more than 2,000 studies, suggests that there is moderate to strong evidence affirming the efficacy of using three techniques: Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, Brainstorming, and Devil’s Advocacy. There were three main findings: face-to-face collaboration decreases creativity, evidence weighting appears to be more important than seeking disconfirming evidence, and conflict tends to improve the quality of analysis. This research also employed an experiment with 21 graduate intelligence studies students, which confirmed the first two findings of the systematic review. The findings of the dissertation represent a contribution to “evidence-based intelligence analysis,” the systematic effort to develop a robust evidence-base linking the use of specific analytic techniques to the improvement of analysis in foreign affairs. Future research might build on the evidence-base presented here to improve intelligence analysis, one of the most important areas of judgment in foreign affairs

Beyond the buzzword: big data and national security decision-making

This article explores the role big data plays in the national security decision-making process. The global surveillance disclosures initiated by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden have increased public and academic discussions about big data and national security. Yet, efforts to summarize and import insights from the vast and interdisciplinary literature on data analytics have remained rare in the field of security studies. To fill this gap, we explain the core characteristics of big data, provide an overview of the techniques and methods of data analytics, and explore how big data can support the core national security process of intelligence. Big data is not only defined by the volume of data but also by their velocity, variety and issues of veracity. Scientists have developed a number of techniques to extract information from big data and support national security practices. We find that data analytics tools contribute to and influence all the core intelligence functions in the contemporary US national security apparatus. However, these tools cannot replace the central role of humans and their ability to contextualize security threats. The fundamental value of big data lies in humans' ability to understand its power and mitigate its limits

Terra Incognita: Mapping American Intelligence Education Curriculum

For more than two decades, degree-granting intelligence programs have popped up around the U.S., representing the largest and perhaps most enduring investment in American intelligence education. Scholars have addressed issues in American intelligence education, but to date, there has been no focused study that has mapped and analyzed these programs. This article addresses this gap by answering the questions: What are the American intelligence programs and what content is being taught? We answered this question by systematically identifying all 17 American intelligence education programs (1992-2012). The picture that emerges is one of delayed, but rapid growth: most programs were founded after 2005. After collecting and analyzing hundreds of course descriptions using a widely-accepted qualitative data analysis method called constant comparison, we mapped the curricular structure of the intelligence programs in aggregate. The contribution of this research is to increase understanding of the structure of American intelligence curriculum for current and future intelligence educators as well as employers

Terra Incognita: Mapping American Intelligence Education Curriculum

For more than two decades, degree-granting intelligence programs have popped up around the U.S., representing the largest and perhaps most enduring investment in American intelligence education. Scholars have addressed issues in American intelligence education, but to date, there has been no focused study that has mapped and analyzed these programs. This article addresses this gap by answering the questions: What are the American intelligence programs and what content is being taught? We answered this question by systematically identifying all 17 American intelligence education programs (1992-2012). The picture that emerges is one of delayed, but rapid growth: most programs were founded after 2005. After collecting and analyzing hundreds of course descriptions using a widely-accepted qualitative data analysis method called constant comparison, we mapped the curricular structure of the intelligence programs in aggregate. The contribution of this research is to increase understanding of the structure of American intelligence curriculum for current and future intelligence educators as well as employers

What crisis? Scholarship and national security

No abstract available

The intelligence community must remove barriers to minority recruitment

No abstract available

The Brave New World of Third Party Location Data

The use of third-party location data (3PLD)—geospatial data captured by smart devices and sold by ‘data brokers’—for intelligence and investigations is increasing each year. This data source provides opportunities for analysts and decision makers to better understand as well as counter a host of security threats from common criminals to terrorists. However, and like other emerging and potent sources of intelligence like social media intelligence (SOCMINT), 3PLD must also be wielded legitimately by the government. We argue that the in the US context the legal framework surrounding these data is unclear. Due to the legal ambiguity as well as technological advancements, we note that misuse by the government is more likely to occur. Concurrently, malicious actors are using 3PLD in ways that threaten security. We argue action from a variety of stakeholders will be necessary to navigate these challenges in the brave new world of commercially available location data

National security relies more and more on dig data. Here's why.

No abstract available

Can colleges teach intelligence? Three security studies professors argue they can, and should

No abstract available